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Confrontation Clause 
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
O n both statutory and constitutional questions, Congress 
has sign ificant power and respons ibili ty to respond to 
Sup reme Court decisions. O n statutory matters, there is 
no ques tion that Congress may negate a Supreme Court 
interpretatio n by enact ing new legislatio n. Consider, for 
example, congressional efforts to countermand Rehnquist 
Court interpretations of federal civi l right statutes, the 
1987 C ivil Rights Resto rat ion Act, and the 1991 C ivi l 
Rights Act. T he 1987 stature nega ted a 1984 Supreme 
Court decisio n, Grove City College v. lJell, 465 U.S. 555 
(1984). Ru li ng that on ly the parts of the college that 
actually received federal aid were subj ect to federal civil 
rights laws (a nd not the college as a whole), Grove City 
severely limited the reach of fed eral civil rights protec-
tions. T he Resto rat ion Act rejected that interpretat io n, 
making clea r that the entire orga nization is subj ect to 
fede ral civil rights protections when any program or 
activity rece ives federal ass istance. 
T he 199 1 C ivil l\ights Act is a more dramatic 
exa mple of Congress's power to respond . In 1989, the 
Supreme Court began to backtrack from its previous 
posit ions on civ il rights and issued five rulings that made 
it more difficult to prove discrimination under Title VII 
(em ployment discri mination) and other statutes . Con-
gress, working in tandem with civil rights groups, crafted 
legislation that nu ll ifIed these and other restrictive 
decisio ns. By enacting the 199 1 Act, Congress overturned 
nine Rehnquist C ourt decisions, made it eas ier for civil 
rights plaintiffs to bring lawsuits, and became the civi l 
rights es tablishment's so-called court of last reso rt. 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISS UES 
On const itu tional questions, there is significant contro-
versy about the scope of Congress's power to respond. 
The reason for this is tbat the press, the American people, 
some members of C ongress, and especially the Supreme 
Court treat Court constitut ional rulings as ftn al and 
deftnit ive. For example, when reporting that six out of ten 
Americans thought the Supreme Court was the ultimate 
constitutional arbiter, newspapers simply noted that those 
s ix were "correct" (Marcus 1987, p. Al3). Likewise, after 
Reagan's attorney general, Edwin M eese (1931-), argued 
that Supreme Court decisio ns were not " b inding on all 
persons and parts of government hencefo rth and for-
evermore," the Senate Judiciary Commirtee was alarmed, 
aski ng Supreme Court nominees to comment on Meese's 
speech (Meese 1987, p. 983). 
For its part, the Supreme Court stridently defe nds its 
power to interpret the Constitut ion. Beginning with Chief 
Justice John Marshall's declaration in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U .S. 137 (I803) that it is "emphatically rhe 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is," the Supreme Court regularly insists that it 
alone delivers the ftnal wo rd on the mean ing of the 
Constitution . Accordin g to a subsequent decision, Mar-
btuy " declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary 
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution" (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U .S. 1 [1958]). In 
a memorable aphorism, Justi ce Robert H. Jackso n claimed 
that decisions by the Supreme Court "are not ftnal 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are ftna l" (Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 [1 953]) . Yet, 
the h istorica l record, as well as the text of the 
Const itution, provides overwhelming evidence that Court 
pronouncements are anything but fInal. Instead, Court 
pronouncements are part of a circular process binding the 
parties in a particular case but othelwise servi ng as one 
moment in an ongoing constitutional dialogue between 
the courts, elected officials, and the American people. 
T he Constitution , fo r example, anticipates that 
Congress wi ll play an important part in shaping the 
Constitution 's meaning. All public officers are required by 
Article VI, clause three " to support this Co nstitutio n." 
T hat obligation is supp lemented by federal law, under 
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which all legislative officials "solemnly swear (or affirm) ... 
ro supporr and defend the Constitution" (5 u.s.c. § 333 1 
[1994]). The Constiturion, moreover, anricipates that 
lawmakers will respond to Supreme Coun rulings. It 
empowers Congress to, among other things, impeach 
judges, make exceptions to the jurisdicrion offederal COUITS, 
confirm judicial nominations, and amend the Constiturion 
(in conjunction with the states, three-fourths of which must 
approve consticutional amendment proposals). Over the 
years, Congress has made use of all of these powers to signal 
its approval or disapproval of federal court decisions. 
In the rwenty-first centu ry it seems farfetched that 
Congress would impeach federal coun judges to express 
disapproval with court decisions. At the time of Marbury v. 
Madison, however, Congress seemed quite willing ro use its 
impeachmenr power to check the federal judiciary. After 
the 1800 elections (where the Jeffersonians rook control of 
the White House and Congress from the Federalists), 
Federalist district judge John Pickering (J 737-1805) was 
impeached and removed, and action against Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel C hase (1741-1811) began. For this 
very reason, the Supreme Court could not issue a 
meaningful remedy against the Jefferson administration 
in Marbury v. Madison (a case in which a Federalist judicial 
appointee challenged the Jefferson administration for 
fililing to deliver his judicial commission ro him) . Indeed, 
C hief justice Marshall was concerned abour impeachment, 
writing ro Justi ce C hase that " a reversal of those legal 
opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would 
certainly better comport with the mildness of our character 
than a removal of the judge who has rendered them 
unknowing of his fa ult" (Beveridge 191 9, p. 177). 
COURT JURISDI CTION 
Article III , clause rwo makes the Supreme Court'S appellate 
jurisdiction subject ro "such exceptions" and "such 
regulations as the Congress shall mal<e." On numerous 
occasions, Congress has threatened ro strip the Court of 
jurisdiction in response ro decisions it disli kes. From 1953 
to 1968, Congress saw Court stripping as a way ro 
countermand the Warren Court-over sixty bills were 
introduced ro limit the jurisdiction of the federal COUITS 
over school desegregation, national securiry, criminal 
confess ions, and much more. And while only one of these 
bills passed (limiting the access of alleged Communists ro 
government documents) , Congress came close ro enacting 
legislation that would have stripped the Supreme Coun of 
jurisdiction in five domestic security areas. In the late 1970s 
and 1980s, Congress again targeted the Supreme Court. An 
am endment to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over 
school prayer was approved by the Senate in 1979; 
proposals ro limit court jurisdiction over abortion and 
school desegregation were also given serious consideration. 
More recently, Congress has taken aim at federal and state 
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court decisions on gay marriage, the pledge of allegiance, 
the public display of the Ten Command ments, and judicial 
invocations of international law. None of these statutes was 
enacted, although limits on court jurisdi ction over same-sex 
marriage and the pledge of allegiance were approved by the 
House of Representatives in 2004. 
In 2005 and 2006, Congress responded ro coun 
decisions by enacting legislation affecting federal court 
jurisdiction . In 2005, Congress expressed disapproval 
with state court decis ion-making in the Terri Schiavo case 
by expanding federal coun jurisd iction. Speciflcally, rather 
than accept state court findings that Sch iavo, then in a 
persistent vegetative state, would rather die than be kept 
alive artiflcially, Congress asked the federal courts to sort 
out whether the removal of a feed ing tube violated 
Schiavo's constiturional rights (For the Relief of the 
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo Act). 
In 2006, Congress limited the habeas corpus rights of 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Responding ro a 
Supreme Coun ruling Hamdan v. Rumsftld, 548 u.s. _ 
(2006), which extended Geneva Convention protections 
ro enemy combatanrs, Congress enacted the MilitalY 
Commission Act. This statute authorized limited federal 
court review of military commiss ion determinations that a 
detainee is an enemy combata nt. More signiflcant, the 
Military Commissions Act prohibited federal court 
consideration of habeas co rpus petitions by Guanranamo 
detainees, limiting their rights to those afforded them by 
military comm issions. When enacti ng the statute, it is 
unclear whether lawmakers intended ro cou ntermand the 
Hamdan Court or, instead, accepted the Court's invita-
tion ro grant "the Pres ident the legislative authori ry ro 
create military commiss ions at issue here." 
Another constiwtionally authorized mechanism ro 
countermand Supreme Court decision-making is the 
Article V amendment process. The Eleventh Amendment 
(ratifled in 1795) was a response ro the Supreme Court's 
decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 4 19 (1793). Chisolm 
ruled that states could be sued in federal courts by citizens of 
another state; the Eleventh Amendment explicitly forbids 
such lawsui ts. T he T hirteenth Amendment (ratified in 
1865) outlawed slavery and, in so doing, nullifled Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Since the 
Reconstruction, however, Congress has rarely amended 
the Constitution in response to Court decisions. T hat has 
not stopped lawmakers from seriously contemplating such 
amendments and constiwtional amendment proposals 
have been considered in response ro Court decisions on 
child labor, abortion , school prayer, and gender equali ty. 
APPOINTMENT OF JU STICES 
Perhaps the principal way that Congress responds ro Court 
decisions is through its power both to confirm Supreme 
Coun nominees and determine the number of justices who 
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sit on the Court. T he process by which the pres ident 
ap points and the Senate confirms Supreme Court nominees 
is often used to change the direction of Cour t decisions. For 
example, after the Supreme Court ruled paper money 
unconstituti onal in 1870, Pres ident Ulysses S. G rant 
(1822- 1885) nominated, and the Senate confirmed, rwo 
justices who vo ted the very nex t year to overturn that 
decision in Legal Tender CaseJ, 79 U.S. 467 (1871). T he 
Senate likewise backed President Franklin D . Roosevelt's 
efforts to appo int justi ces supportive of economic regula-
tion, especially Congress's use of the commerce clause as an 
agent of social change. From, these N ew Deal appointees 
overturned decisio ns and, in so do ing, paved the way for the 
modern regulatory state. D uring the period from 1937 to 
1944, thirty decisio ns were overrul ed. 
Senate support fo r Roosevel t's Supreme Court picks, 
however, d id not translate into Senate support for 
Roosevelt's controversial Court-packing plan . Before 
Supreme C ourt vaca ncies allowed him to reshape 
consti[Utional law, Roosevelt felt stymied by a pro-
business Supreme Coure. His solu tion was to increase the 
size of the Court so that the balance of power wou ld shi ft 
to pro-New Deal Justices. Congress took this proposal 
seriously and there was good reason to think that it wou ld 
back the Pres ident. However, through the so-called switch 
in time that saved nine, the Supreme Court reversed 
co urse on its own. Fo r its part, Congress saw no reason to 
check a Court that seemed willing to check itself. 
LEGI SLATIVE RESPONSES 
T he above in ventory, whil e signifi cant, merely scratches 
the surface of poss ible congress io nal responses to Supreme 
Co urt decisio ns. Congress, for example, may enact 
legislat ion that seeks to limit the reach of Supreme Court 
rulings . After the Supreme Cou rt uph eld abo rti on rights 
in Roe v. Wade, 4 10 U.S . 11 3 ( 1973), Congress blocked 
the use of Medica id and orher federal funds to pay for 
abortions. Congress also o ffe red reli gious orga nizations 
federal funds to promote sexual abst inence as a method of 
birth control. T he Supreme COUIT ap proved both of these 
sta[Utes and , in so doing, val idated Congress's use of its 
appropriation powers to respond to Supreme Court 
rulings (Harris 1). M~Rae, 448 U.S. 297 [1980]). T he 
Supreme Court also uph eld a 2003 federal statute 
prohibiting intact dilations and ex tract ions, enacted in 
response to a 2000 Court ruling that a state ban on so-
called partial b irth abort ions was unconstitutionally vague 
(Gonzales v. Cmhart, 550 U.S. _ (2007 1). 
Co ngress may also respond to a Supreme Court 
decision by reenacting a statute that the Court struck 
down. Fo r example, Congress strongly d isagreed with the 
Court 's 1918 ruling thar the commerce power could not be 
used to regulate child labo r (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. 
S. 25 1 [19 18]) . The very nex t year, Congress sought to 
make use of an alternative power (the taxing power) to 
enact child labor legislation . Again , the Supreme Court 
struck the statute down (Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 
20 [1922]) . In 1938, afte r the Court's composition had 
changed, Congress aga in based child labor legislation o n 
commerce clause legislat ion that a unanimo us Court 
upheld (United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 [1941]). 
Congress has also taken aim at Court decisions 
through its powers to enfo rce the Fourteenth (equal 
prorection) and Fifteenth (voting rights) Amendments. 
Rejecting a 1980 Supreme Court decision requiring civil 
rights plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in vote 
d ilution cases (Mo bile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 [1980]) , 
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to allow for 
impact-based proof.~ of vote dilution. Congress likewise 
disapproved of the 1990 Supreme Coun decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990) that 
limired rhe abiliry of plaint iffs to succeed in religious 
liberty lawsui ts, and enacted legislatio n thar required 
governmental actors to have a "compelling governmental 
interest" whenever religious libeny was " burdened. " T his 
legislation , the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), was subsequently invalidared by the Supreme 
Court in City of Boerne 1). Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
Unwilling to accept defeat, Congress enacted a scaled 
down version of the RFRA, rhe Religious Land Use and 
lnsrirllt io nalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a sratute thar the 
Supreme Court upheld (against a preliminalY challenge) 
in 2005 (Cutter v. Willeinson, 544 U .S. 709 [2005]) . 
T he RLU1PA statute highlights Congress's willing-
ness to respond to a Court ruling by advancing its policy 
agenda in ways thar it thin ks the Court w ill approve. 
W hen enacting RLUIPA, lawmakers paid close arrention 
to the Supreme Court decision invalidating the RFRA 
with Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S . 507 (997), seeking to 
advance their policy agenda while not calling into 
ques tion the Court's handiwork. Likewise, afrer the 
Supreme Court invalidated a stature banning guns within 
1,000 fee l' of a school (as an impermissible exercise of 
Congress's commerce power) in United States v. Lopez, 
5 14 U.S. 548 (1995), Congress amended the G un- Free 
School Zones Acr to require the federal government to 
prove th at the firea rm had either moved in inrersrate 
commerce or otherwise afFecred interstate commerce. 
Another way that Congress expresses its disagreement 
wirh the Supreme Court is to protecr rights rhat the Court 
says it need not pro tecr. Following a 1986 Supreme Court 
decis ion upholding an Air Force regulatio n that had 
prohibited an observant Jew fro m wearing a yarmulke in 
Golden v. Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503, Congress enacted 
legislat ion allowing service members to express their faith 
by wearing neat and conservarive religiOUS apparel. In 
1999, Congress responded to concerns that independenr 
counsels were overzealous when inves tigating high-ranking 
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executive branch officials. Specifically, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's lopsided seven-to-one approval of this 
statute with the decision of Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, in 1988, Congress concluded that the statute was 
fundamentally flawed and ought not to be reauthorized 
with the Ethics in Government Act. 
Congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions 
are not always hostile. Sometimes the Court invites 
Congress to enact legislation that would effectively negate 
a Court ruling. For example, when upholding state power 
to issue search warrants of newspapers, the Court invited a 
legislative response noting that its decision " does nor 
prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to 
establish nonconsititutional protections against possible 
abuses of the search warrant procedure" (Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 [1978]). Congress accepted 
the invitation, passing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
to prohibit third-party searches of newspapers. 
On other occasions, Congress affirmatively assists in 
the implementation of a Court decision . In response to 
resistance in the South to school desegregation, Congress 
took bold steps to make Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), a reality. In 1964, it prohibited segregated 
school systems from receiving federal aid and authorized the 
Department of] ustice to file desegregation lawsuits. These 
federal efforrs proved critical to ending dual school systems. 
More desegregation took place the year after these legislative 
programs took effect than in the decade following Brown. 
As the above discussion makes clear, the Supreme 
Court does not speak the last word on the meaning of 
federal statutes or the Constitution. Congress can nullifY 
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes by 
enacting a new statute or amending an existing law. On 
constitutional issues, the dynamic is more complex. 
Congress can respond to Supreme Court constitutional 
rulings through a variety of techniques, r3.nging from the 
enactment of the very same statute to the confirmation of 
Supreme Court justices who are likely to distinguish or 
overturn disfavored rulings. Through these varied re-
sponses to Supreme Court rulings, Congress plays a 
critical role in shaping constitutional values. 
SEE ALSO Eleventh Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; 
Jurisdiction Stripping; Reconstruction 
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